Written by Henry Heren, MODET Senior Instructor, SPA 

“The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, its agencies, or its officers.” 

For decades, space was seen as a pristine realm—a place of scientific discovery, satellite TV, and GPS directions. But that vision has been obliterated. Today, space is a contested, congested, and competitive operational warfighting domain. Our adversaries aren’t just watching the stars; they’re jamming, spoofing, and probing U.S. systems in orbit. And we’re letting them.

The U.S. military’s dependence on space for operations—from intelligence and targeting to secure communications and navigation—is absolute. Yet our approach to defending those space assets remains passive, cautious, and often stuck in outdated doctrine. Space is no longer merely a peaceful realm for human exploration; it’s a combat zone. And we must update our thinking and our posture accordingly.

Unfortunately, traditional space operators and decision-makers still treat adversary space threats like inconvenient disruptions instead of strategic acts of aggression. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) rarely factor space resilience into campaign planning with the same urgency they apply to fuel, beans, and bullets. Meanwhile, interference with satellites—whether through jamming, cyberattacks, or shadowing by adversary spacecraft—has become business as usual for China, Russia, and others. Our response? Stern statements and PowerPoint decks.

We need to change that—fast.

It’s Time to Normalize Space Defense

The U.S. must institutionalize counter-counterspace fires—non-kinetic and kinetic—as standard, acceptable, and even expected military responses. That means rejecting the myth that protecting our satellites is somehow “escalatory.” If adversaries can attack space assets with impunity while we worry about diplomatic optics, they will continue to see space as a low-risk, high-reward battleground. That’s not restraint; that’s strategic surrender.

Defending space doesn’t mean launching missiles at every provocation. But it does mean building clear rules of engagement (ROE), empowering commanders with real-time authority to act, and training joint forces to respond to space threats with speed and confidence. Space-based targeting, ISR, and communications are not auxiliary—they are foundational. And when they’re attacked, we must respond as we would if it were a ship, plane, or troop formation.

Start Treating Satellites Like Combat Assets

U.S. doctrine still clings to a phased model of warfare, where kinetic action is reserved for later stages. But adversary attacks to our capabilities in space won’t wait for the Combatant Commander to declare Phase II—they’re happening while the State Department is still drafting a démarche. Waiting to respond until conflict escalates is like locking the front door after the thief is already gone. Our adversaries aren’t waiting for a declaration of war. Neither should we.

GCCs and space operators must operate as a single, integrated team. That means sharing priorities, aligning targeting decisions, and accepting that space assets—like any other military platform—sometimes need to take risks to accomplish the mission. Space professionals can no longer act as celestial custodians whose priority is longevity over utility.

Update the Rules of Engagement—and Enforce Them

We need clear, updated ROE that blend cyber, electromagnetic, and kinetic responses with credibility and clarity. These options must be discussed, rehearsed, and understood well before conflict is on the horizon. If our adversaries can act in minutes while we deliberate for months, we’re not deterring threats—we’re scheduling them.

The U.S. must communicate and operate under standing ROE that define thresholds for action. Right now, adversaries are testing us one interference at a time—because we’ve signaled that the cost of doing so is low. If a foreign actor jammed a U.S. ship’s radar or spoofed a fighter jet’s GPS in international airspace, the response wouldn’t be a memo. So why should it be in orbit?

Allies Matter, but So Does Action

Partnering with allies is essential to building collective deterrence. But polite statements and ambiguous bilateral agreements won’t cut it. We need multinational frameworks with real bite—clear norms, shared response plans, and standing coalitions ready to respond together when space-based assets are threatened.

Diplomacy is important. But diplomacy without the credible threat of consequence is just noise.

Conclusion: Space Isn’t the Final Frontier—It’s the Frontline

If we want to maintain our advantage in space, we must stop admiring the problem and start solving it. That means updating doctrine, rewriting ROEs, expanding training exercises, and developing rapid response capabilities that allow us to act—not just react.

Space can’t be the one domain where our adversaries are free to act aggressively without fear of reprisal. If we continue down this path, we’re not just risking assets—we’re risking our ability to fight and win in every other domain.

It’s time to act. Not eventually. Not after we’ve lost capability. Now.

Because the next conflict may start in space. And if we’re still checking what operational phase we’re in when it does, we’ve already lost.